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# *Patterns of Value Change During Economic Development: An Empirical Study*

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## *Abstract*

Values were studied in four economically diverse communities: (1) a farm subsistence community, (2) a rapidly industrializing farm community, (3) a stable industrial community, and (4) a professional-bureaucratic community. These four communities were assumed to represent four distinct stages in the process of economic development. In each community, the level of modernity in three value components was assessed: *familism-individualism*, *present-futurism*, *passivism-activism*. By comparing the level of modernity of values across communities, the pattern or profile of change in values during economic development was measured. Results indicated that *individualism* and *activism* increased dramatically with initial economic development, while *futurism* increased only during the terminal stage of economic development. Results were accounted for in terms of changes in economic structure during modernization.

## *Caractéristiques de changements de valeurs au cours du développement économique: Etude empirique*

Les valeurs ont été étudiées dans quatre communautés économiquement différentes: (1) une communauté vivant uniquement des fermes; (2) une communauté agricole s'industrialisant rapidement; (3) une communauté industrielle stable; et (4) une communauté représentée par des professions libérales et bureaucratiques. Ces quatre communautés étaient supposées représenter quatre étapes distinctes de développement économique. Dans chaque communauté, on a évalué le niveau de modernité en se servant de trois éléments de valeurs: l'intérêt familial opposé à l'individualisme, l'intérêt pour le présent opposé à celui pour l'avenir, la passivité opposée à l'activité. En comparant le niveau de modernité des valeurs à travers les communautés, on a mesuré les caractéristiques ou le profil des changements de valeurs au cours du développement économique. Les résultats ont indiqué que l'individualisme et l'activité augmentaient de façon dramatique au début du développement économique, alors que l'intérêt pour l'avenir augmentait seulement pendant la dernière période du développement social. On a expliqué les résultats en fonction des changements de structure économique pendant la modernisation.

## *Normas de cambio de valores durante desarrollo económico: un estudio empírico*

Fueron estudiados los valores en cuatro comunidades diversas económicamente: (1) una comunidad de subsistencia agrícola, (2) una comunidad agrícola de industrialización rápida, (3) una comunidad industrial estable, y (4) una comunidad burocrática-profesional. Se asumía que estas cuatro comunidades representan

cuatro etapas distintas en el proceso de desarrollo económico. En cada comunidad, el nivel de modernidad en tres partes constitutivas de valores se calculó como sigue: *familismo-individualismo*, *actualidad-futurismo*, *pasivismo-activismo*. La norma o el perfil de cambio en los valores durante el desarrollo económico se midió haciendo una comparación del nivel de modernidad de valores entre las comunidades. Los resultados indicaron que el *individualismo* y el *activismo* aumentaron sorprendentemente con el desarrollo económico inicial, mientras que el *futurismo* aumentó solo durante la etapa final del desarrollo económico. Los resultados se explican por medio de los cambios de estructura económica durante la modernización.

**S**INCE WEBER'S SEMINAL analysis of the impact of values on the emergence of capitalistic economic institutions,<sup>1</sup> social scientists have been alerted to the interaction between values and society. For example, Kluckhohn, Strodtbeck, and Rosen have noted the relevance of values in the analysis of social stratification,<sup>2</sup> while others have, with varying degrees of success, developed typologies of values to describe and classify different social structures.<sup>3</sup> Recently, there has been a renewed emphasis on the relationship of various patterns of values to the economic development of "third world" nations.<sup>4</sup> One of the most consistent findings from this research is that while variations inevitably exist, certain clusters of values tend to be endemic to certain types of social structures. Thus, Rosen and Kahl, among others, document different patterns of values in economically developed and undeveloped social systems.<sup>5</sup> Although the causal nexus has yet to be sorted out, one conclusion is that certain general patterns of values are compatible with social structural conditions to the extent that economically developed nations display a similar pattern of values which is distinct from that *common* pattern typical of underdeveloped nations. The presumption is that as a social system modernizes, values shift from one cluster or pattern, usually called "traditional," to another more "modern" pattern. While this is undoubtedly the case, no studies have yet documented the *sequence of change* in the components of these value clusters as they shift from a traditional to a modern profile. It seems unlikely that the components of a traditional value system shift randomly, or in concert, to a modern profile during economic development. Rather, components of such a value system probably shift at different rates during change in social structural conditions.

This paper attempts to document this differential shift in the components of a value system during economic development. While no firm causal inferences

are made, it is presumed that change in a component of a value system will be in a direction compatible with changes occurring on a social structural level.

### Methodology

**VARIABLES.** *Values* are criteria or standards by which alternatives to action are selected.<sup>6</sup> Values thus channel, guide, control, and direct individual and collective action. Although there is considerable agreement over this definition, authors differ in their emphasis on the cathectic, cognitive, evaluative, and directive elements of values. The present paper emphasizes the *directive* component of values. This emphasis is consistent with several conceptual schemes.<sup>7</sup> Both Rosen and Kahl have identified various value system components particularly useful in the analysis of economic development. Three of these, most notable in Rosen's work,<sup>8</sup> are examined here: *familism/individualism*, *future/present*, and *activism/passivism*.

The familism/individualism component concerns the extent to which actors are directed to maintain obligatory ties with their kin of orientation. The present/future component directs actors to concentrate either on the present and immediate gratifications or on the necessity for planning and foregoing immediate gratifications in the pursuit of future goals. Activism/passivism directs actors to be either active and manipulative of their social and physical environment, or passive and accepting conditions of environmental conditions as unalterable.

These three components tend to cluster in relation to particular social structures. Individualism, futurism, and activism have been consistently found to direct action in more modern social systems, while familism, present orientation and passivism are typical of more traditional, economically undeveloped systems.<sup>9</sup> When a social system modernizes, the familism-present-passivism complex is presumed to change in the direction of an individualism-futurism-activism cluster. However, the pattern of change in these components, and how such change is connected to economic development, has yet to be examined.

**Economic Structures.** Endemic to the modernization of a social system is the increasing differentiation and proliferation of the status role network and basic institutions.<sup>10</sup> Such differentiation is initially most evident with respect to the occupational status role structure of a social system. Changes in occupational structures are thus one of the best indicators of

economic development. While other indicators have proved useful, it is felt that certain types of changes in the occupational composition of a system could prove most useful in the analysis of the relationship between changes in value system components and social structure.

**THE COMPARATIVE METHOD.** Ideally, an examination of change in values in relation to economic development should be made by observing the operation over time of an established set of components. Since such a method is not always practical, comparative methods are employed as a substitute. In the study of modernization, this means that social systems at distinctly different stages of economic development are compared, and, from observed differences between systems, inferences about change in variables from stage to stage are then made. The comparative approach, however, encounters severe methodological difficulties since variations in the culture, history, market access, natural resources, and political and other societal structures of each system make it difficult to isolate the effect of specific variables. To the extent that this problem can be overcome, the comparative method can yield valuable information about change.

In selecting a field for the present study, an attempt was made to find one with not only diverse stages in the process of economic development, but also one with minimal cultural variability from stage to stage. The final selection was a state located in the deep South of the United States. In this state, both extremes of the modernity continuum could easily be isolated. At one end were whole communities dominated by a farm subsistence economy where farmers used horse-drawn plows to cultivate small tracts of land, while at the other end were highly modern communities in which professional and bureaucratic structures were dominant. Distinct transitional stages between these two could be isolated.

Within this state, four types of communities corresponding to conspicuous stages of economic development were selected. These communities were designated: (1) farm subsistence, (2) farm transitional, (3) industrial, and (4) modern. By examining values within each community type and then comparing differences in value profiles between communities, inferences about the pattern of change of value system components during economic development were made. A brief description of these four community types follows.

*The Farm Subsistence Community.* The initial point from which economic development begins is usually a social system dominated by a farm subsistence economy. In such an economy, small tracts of land are cultivated by human and animal power. Family members are actively engaged in the productive process. The subsistence farmers in the sampling area of this study used horse drawn plows and family labor to cultivate and harvest crops. Several years ago cotton and tobacco were the major crops, but in recent years, tomatoes, cucumbers, and potatoes have become the principal crops, since they offer a greater profit. However, the average income of these farmers is less than \$2,500 per year.

*The Farm Transitional Community.* Economic development begins when industry starts to displace farming as the major basis of economic organization. The abandonment of farm subsistence through employment in decentralized industries or through migration to urban centers represents a profound reorganization of economic life. The farm transitional community included in this study was undergoing such an economic change. Only fifteen years ago, 95 percent of the families in the community were engaged in subsistence farming. But due to the establishment of three factories by large state-wide companies in this area, only 16 percent of the families in the community are presently subsistence farmers. Over 60 percent of the family heads are employed in these local factories. A small urban center has emerged, providing employment for the rest of the population. However, little urbanism exists, since family heads are able to live on their now unattended farms and commute to their jobs. This community, then, is experiencing rapid industrialization and is transitional between a purely farm subsistence and a stable industrial economic system.

*The Industrial Community.* After initial industrialization, a period of urbanization and stabilization of industry usually occurs. In the South, the first major industry revolved around the processing of cotton, and today cotton and synthetic mills represent one of the most well-developed and conspicuous industrial bases for many southern states. An established cotton and synthetic mill community was selected as representative of a well-developed and stable industrial system. This community was dominated by three mills which provided employment for most of the working population. The mills have existed since the Civil War (although the actual plants have been rebuilt several times) and are locally-owned and managed. There is no other industry in the community, although some

household heads perform nonindustrial, manual labor. There is a central business district, providing some white-collar jobs. The community is highly urbanized with families living in small frame houses near the mills and business center. No working farms exist within thirty miles of the city and few family heads have ever farmed in their lifetime.

*The Modern Community.* Modern societies, while displaying well-developed industrial structures, are dominated by bureaucratic, professional, and service-oriented structures. At least three interrelated forces account for this fact: (1) the increasing application of advanced technology to heavy industry makes reliance on man power considerably less evident, (2) the increasing complexity of the economy and other areas of social structure requires more and more administrative structures, and (3) the increasing need for services on the part of a wage-earning labor force accelerates the growth of service-oriented (as opposed to production-oriented) industries. These latter structures tend to be primarily white-collar, professional and/or bureaucratic. For this study, the most modern community in the state was studied. This city was too large to examine in total and therefore the most typically white-collar, middle-class residential area within the city was selected as representative of a highly modern social system. In this area, 86 percent of the household heads were employed in white-collar occupations with nearly 70 percent of these employed in large bureaucracies. Seventeen percent of white-collar workers owned their own businesses. A few well-paid family heads from production-based industry also lived in the community. Although this community is unlike the others in that it is not a separate municipality, it is considered to display the type of economic structure increasingly characteristic of highly modern societies.

There is at least one major difference between the more traditional economic structures in the present field of study and those in most nation-states undergoing economic development. That is, well-developed transportation, education, and mass media structures exist at *all* stages of modernization, even in the farm subsistence community. This is probably not true of farm subsistence in most "third world" modernizers. This fact has certain advantages, since involvement in mass media and educational structures are constant, with the result that a kind of "natural control" on these variables exists. This in turn allows for better isolation of the relationship between changes in values and changes in economic structure.

**MEASUREMENT OF VALUES.** Values were measured by a Likert-type set of questions which have proven highly useful in previous studies of values.<sup>11</sup> Kahl's thorough summary and analysis of the literature on various value orientation indices proved particularly useful because his data made it possible to select only those items which had demonstrated usefulness in the study of values. In all, thirteen items measuring the three value components of familism/individualism, orientation toward present/futurism, and passivism/activism were selected from his summary. Although this is a small index, the items contained within it have demonstrated reliability and validity.

**SAMPLE.** The subjects of the present study were adolescent males, selected because they represent the next significant input into the occupational structure of a community. Their values, as acquired in the family and from other socializing agents, are thus the most likely to reflect the demands and requisites of the economic structure of a community. In each community, the value orientation index of thirteen items was administered to the entire seventh and eighth grade male population.

**HYPOTHESES.** Before hypothesizing the pattern of change of various value components, it was necessary to document some of the economic conditions compatible with a traditional value system as the starting point for value change. A value system displaying the components of familism, passivism, and present orientation is the most compatible with a farm subsistence economy. In this kind of economy, where productivity is inevitably low due to low levels of technology and where actors are thus poorly insulated from natural elements, a value component of activism would be highly frustrating and disruptive for actors, because they do not possess the technology, equipment, or resources to master their environment. This lack of technology results in the utilization of manual labor in the productive processes. Since land tracts are small and relatively unproductive, income from the land is correspondingly small. Consequently, family labor is employed, since wage labor would be financially impossible. Such a need for family labor usually leads to some form of extended family structure and thus to the value component of familism. The third component of a traditional value system, present orientation, is also highly compatible with this form of economic structure. When there is little beyond manual labor with which to realize plans, when severe and unpredictable elements can destroy plans, and when income and survival for the present are

problematical, a value of futurism would be both irrelevant and potentially disruptive since long-range goals could not easily be realized.

The process of modernization is considered to begin when the farm subsistence economic system changes. With these changes on the social structural level, the components of the value system must also change if some degree of compatibility between values and social structural conditions is to be maintained. This can be expressed in a set of hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1: As a system moves from a farm subsistence to a farm transitional form of economic organization, the value component of FAMILISM will change to a greater degree than in the transition from either a farm transitional to industrial or industrial to modern form of economic organization.*

The emergence of industrial structures usually results in the breakdown of the extended family, because of the increased differentiation of the economy from the family.<sup>12</sup> Such a drastic structural change should be reflected in an equally radical change in relevant value components, such as familism/individualism.

*Hypothesis 2: As a system moves from an industrial to a modern form of economic organization, the value component of FUTURISM will change to a greater extent than in the transition from either a farm subsistence to a farm transitional or from a farm transitional to an industrial form of economic organization.*

The transition from a farm subsistence economy to a farm-transitional and industrial system does not necessitate an emphasis on the future, since in both these latter systems action is highly programmed by technology and/or highly routine. However, economic structures in modern systems continually focus on long-range goals. If all actors remained present-oriented, disruption of the system would be inevitable. Therefore, futurism should increase most in the transition to a modern form of economic organization.

*Hypothesis 3: As a system moves from a farm subsistence to a farm transitional, and from an industrial to modern form of economic organization, the value component of ACTIVISM will change to greater extent than in the transition from a farm transitional to an industrial form of economic organization.*

In the farm transitional stage, greater activism is demanded to the extent that status role occupants must now go to work at specified times, work at a relatively consistent output, perform tasks in specified ways, not be absent too often, and the like.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, since a wage-earning labor force begins to emerge,

more economic surplus exists which in turn allows for greater control and mastery of the environment. However, since activity in farm transitional and industrial systems is either highly routine or mechanized and since a large economic surplus does not exist, high levels of activism are not predicted. With professionalization and bureaucratization of the economic structure, actors must now work at high levels of output, be willing to cope with uncertainties, be capable of meeting unanticipated problems, and be able to master the complexity of their environment.<sup>14</sup> Not only this, but actors now possess considerable economic surplus which furthers their ability to control and manipulate the environment. Under all these conditions, then, increased activism could be expected.

*Hypothesis 4(a): As a system initially shifts from a farm subsistence to farm transitional form of economic organization, the component of FAMILISM will shift in the direction of modernity to a greater extent than ACTIVISM or FUTURISM with activism increasing more than futurism.*

*Hypothesis 4(b): As a system moves from a farm transitional to industrial basis of economic organization, the components of the value system will change only moderately and to the same degree.*

*Hypothesis 4(c): As a system shifts from an industrial to modern form of economic organization, the component of FUTURISM shifts to a greater degree than ACTIVISM or FAMILISM, with activism increasing more than familism.*

These three hypotheses indicate the predicted pattern of change in the three value components relative to each other. While both activism and individualism are seen as rising with initial industrialization, individualism should increase more than activism since, despite a wage income, regularized work patterns, and a small economic surplus, mastery and control of the environment is still limited, whereas mobility out of the family is not only possible, but has a certain amount of utility. Similarly, in the transition to a professional/bureaucratic form of economic organization, futurism is predicted to change more than either individualism or activism, with the latter increasing more than individualism. Futurism rises with the increased instrumental focus of a modern economy and the necessity for planning; and activism rises more than individualism because of the increased mastery and control required in economic status roles and the increased economic surplus of actors. Also, because individualism undergoes its major shift with the initial differentiation of the family from the economy (farm-transitional), subsequent changes in this compo-

TABLE 1. MODERNITY OF VALUE INDEX ITEMS BY COMMUNITY (PERCENTAGE)

	Farm Sub.	Farm Trans.	Indus.	Modern	P*
<i>Familism/Individualism</i>					
If you have a chance to hire an assistant in your work, it is always better to hire a relative than a stranger.	34	61	75	78	.001
When you are in trouble, only a relative can be depended upon to help you out.	34	68	85	89	.001
It should be enough satisfaction to parents if a son is a success even though he lives far away.	83	81	83	85	N.S.
When looking for a job a person ought to find a position near his parents even if that means losing a good opportunity elsewhere.	44	71	84	90	.001
A family should be willing to sacrifice many things in order to help support their aged parents.	8	14	11	13	N.S.
<i>Present/Futurism</i>					
Nowadays a wise parent will teach his children to live for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.	38	47	52	65	.001
It is foolish to accept life the way it is, since things can always be changed.	77	67	69	71	N.S.
Planning only makes a person unhappy, since your plans hardly ever work out anyhow.	49	56	63	81	.001
<i>Activism/Passivism</i>					
Children should be taught not to expect too much out of life so they won't be disappointed.	32	31	28	36	N.S.
Children should learn early that there isn't much you can do about the way things are going to turn out in life.	21	38	40	56	.001
All I want out of life in the way of a career is a secure, not too difficult job, with enough pay to afford a nice car and eventually a home.	14	39	40	42	.001
When a man is born, the success he's going to have is already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.	33	54	68	79	.001
The secret of happiness is not expecting too much out of life, and being content with what comes your way.	28	32	26	33	N.S.
Totals (N = 813)	113	228	184	228	

\*X<sup>2</sup> tests were used to determine statistical significance.

nent are moderate. However, with the urbanization accompanying stabilization of industry, the institutionalization of the conjugal, neo-local family pattern initiated in the farm-transitional stage becomes more complete with the result that individualism should increase somewhat.

These six hypotheses were formulated prior to collection of the data. They represented predictions about the profile of value change from an analysis of the economic structure of four conspicuous stages of economic development. Data were subsequently analyzed in light of these hypotheses.

### Findings

Table 1 reports the percentage of subjects in each community displaying modern value orientations on the items of the value index. Items either discriminated dramatically or not at all. Items which discriminated at a statistically significant level are the basis for the discussion of the hypothesis.

In Table 2, the index items which discriminated significantly among communities are averaged with respect to each component. Table 2 thus reveals the absolute levels of individualism, futurism, and activism for each stage of economic development. However, comparisons of absolute differences in value components at each stage of economic development are

TABLE 2. OVER-ALL MODERNITY OF VALUES BY COMMUNITY (PERCENTAGES)

Value Components	Community			
	Farm Sub.	Farm Trans.	Indus.	Modern
Individualism	37	67	81	86
Futurism	43	52	58	73
Activism	23	44	49	59
Totals (N = 813)	113	228	184	288

hazardous, since the index items may be measuring the various components at different levels of effectiveness in each community. The more central question in light of this shortcoming and the research question of this study is the relative amount of change in each component rather than the absolute changes in components (see Figure 4 below). All that can be firmly concluded from Table 2 is that individualism, futurism, and activism have increased considerably by the modern stage of economic development over what

they were at the farm subsistence stage. The *pattern* of change in these components is explored in Figures 1 through 4 below.

Figure 1 plots the value index items from Table 1 with respect to the component of familism/individualism across the four communities. The overall percentages from Table 2 are also plotted on Figure 1. It is evident that each individual index item for this value component displays a similar pattern of change across the four communities. This similar clustering of individual items makes highly meaningful the average percentage score reported in Table 2 and plotted on Figure 1. The figure clearly reveals that the value of familism declines dramatically in the direction of individualism during initial industrialization. This finding is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1.






Figure 2 plots the data from Tables 1 and 2 for the value component of present/futurism. As with familism/individualism, the individual index items cluster, thus making the average percentage scores representative of the data. Figure 2 reveals that futurism increases less during the initial stages of economic development than during the terminal stage. Futurism rises sharply only in the transition to highly bureaucratized and professionalized economic structure. This pattern of change supports Hypothesis 2.




Figure 3 represents the data from Tables 1 and 2 for the value component of passivism/activism. Although the average index percentages approximate a pattern of

value change similar to that predicted in Hypothesis 3, it is highly suspect, since the individual index items do not display the clustering across communities evident with respect to individualism and futurism. The only pattern of items supporting Hypothesis 3 is the sharp increase in activism during initial industrialization away from a farm subsistence economy.

Figure 3. Economic Development and Activism





Figure 4 plots the relative pattern of change among the three value components.<sup>15</sup> Contrary to Hypothesis 4(a), activism and individualism increase at approximately the same rate during initial industrialization. However, the relationship between individualism and futurism is as predicted in hypothesis 4(a). Hypothesis 4(b) and 4(c) are supported by the data.

Figure 4. Relative Changes Among Value System Components



#### Discussion and Conclusions

These data must be interpreted cautiously, since their collection was based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed that a small battery of proven items was more desirable than a large collection of new and unproven items. This forces discussion and conclusions of this rather complex problem to be based on the discriminatory power of only a few questionnaire items. With items other than those employed here, this would be extremely hazardous. Since the value orientation index reported in Table 1 has demonstrated its usefulness in many studies,<sup>16</sup> this

objection can be partially overcome. Second, it was also assumed that the four communities represented distinct forms of economic organization which would provide meaningful focal points for observing value changes. Although it is felt that these communities constitute significant and distinct stages in economic organization during the process of modernization, this assumption can always be questioned because of the enormous variability from one concrete system to another in the processes of modernization. Furthermore, it can be questioned as to whether or not the communities in this study represent equal increment increases in modernity. This is the assumption made in Figures 1 through 4 where the communities are placed at equal intervals from each other. To the extent that the four communities do not represent equal intervals of modernity, the actual pattern of value change reported in the Figures is inaccurate.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, it was assumed that the comparative method would allow meaningful statements about value change. By examining differences in the value orientations of actors in distinct systems representing stages of modernization, it seemed possible to draw general conclusions about change in various value system components. Cultural variability from system to system not related to the selected, focal variables of a study makes this a somewhat tenuous methodological assumption; but the comparative methodology of the present study diminishes the problem by using an area where there is a shared language, cultural heritage, political organization, and exposure to media and educational structures in all four communities.

Findings reveal strong familial values among subjects in the farm subsistence community. Such values can be predicted from the economic organization of a farm subsistence system where family labor is required. This reliance on family labor generates a whole series of values emphasizing family loyalty and duty to close kin. Hence, there would be few actors individualistically-oriented in a farm-subsistence economic system. This conclusion is supported by the data reported in Tables 1 and 2. However, as soon as the economic conditions supporting a value of familism break down, one would predict that a value of individualism would rise sharply. Figure 1 plots this expected sharp rise in individualism with the beginnings of industrialization. In the farm-transitional community, familial and economic activities become separated. Because males in an industrial system can derive an above-subsistence income from their work away from the household, they can now leave the home permanently, and can

even gain economic advantages in leaving. Coupled with the fact that industrial societies increasingly recruit in terms of universalistic and achievement criteria rather than particularistic and ascriptive criteria, the family becomes even less relevant to recruitment and participation in the economy. The sharp decline of familism and rise of individualism occurs during this initial industrialization. In subsequent stages, individualism increases less dramatically since changes in the relationship of the family to the economy are not of the same magnitude as during initial industrialization away from a farm subsistence system.

Although the research design does not permit strong causal inferences, the transition away from a farm subsistence economic system to a farm transitional system does allow for some speculation. Since industry in the farm transitional community was implanted by companies from *outside* the community, the industry was present *before* modernity of values. And since prior to its industrialization, the farm-transitional community was structurally the same as the farm-subsistence community, it can be concluded that values in this transition changed in response to changes in the economic conditions. The very fact that even with involvement in formal education and exposure to mass media, actors in the farm subsistence community *still* possessed traditional values indicates the profound influence the economic structure, via family socialization, has on value formation. Parents, as they begin to occupy industrial status roles, apparently alter their socialization practices in such a way that their sons possess values appropriate to the demands of the new economic structure.<sup>17</sup>

The results on futurism presented in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 indicate that during the initial stages of economic development, present orientations tend to dominate. Only during the last stage of economic development does futurism increase markedly, at a point where planning and focusing on, as well as anticipating, the future become necessary activities of the many professional and bureaucratic actors in the economy. Furthermore, since incomes in modern systems are considerably above that necessary for subsistence, actors can be oriented beyond the immediate present. In less modern economic systems, structural conditions are not conducive to a value of futurism. In the farm subsistence economy, for example, actors can hardly be oriented to the future, since survival in the present is so highly problematic. Although greater futurism might be expected in an industrial economic system, it is unnecessary in the

workplace where action is highly circumscribed by the machine technology and authority structure of a factory system. And even though a wage earning labor force usually possesses a small economic surplus, survival in the present is sufficiently problematic to hinder the formation of futuristic values.

Activism in a farm subsistence economy may be low due to actors' inability to control and manipulate their environment. With emancipation from the land and natural elements, and regularized employment with a wage income, actors begin to have some control in meeting their material needs. Under these changed conditions, where mastery of the environment becomes possible, activism rises sharply (as shown in Figure 3). In fact, activism increases more during initial industrialization than at all other stages of economic development combined (see Table 2). Employment in regularized industrial occupations results in a more profound change in the values of actors than was anticipated in Hypothesis 3. Seemingly, once actors are freed from the constraints of a farm-subsistence economy, passivism as an orientation becomes almost as irrelevant to industrial workers as was activism to subsistence farmers.

The relative pattern of change in value components indicates that individualism and activism change at about the same rate during economic development, especially the beginning stages (see Figure 4). Individualism rises radically during initial industrialization in response to the structural differentiation of the family from the economy, whereas activism increases sharply at this stage in response to new job experiences in an industrial system. The concomitant, but less radical, increases in these components during subsequent stages of economic development is most likely the result of the increasing differentiation of the household from work and the gradual escalation of work roles requiring, and allowing, mastery and control of the environment. On the other hand, futurism does not shift radically until the terminal stage of economic development, when work roles require planning and instrumental focus, while at the same time providing the facilities for this orientation outside the work situation. Thus values apparently change in response to different, though related and overlapping, economic conditions.

Although no firm conclusions can be drawn, the data allow for at least the following generalizations about how values change during economic development:

1. All components of a value system do not shift in concert, nor randomly, from a traditional to modern profile during economic development.

2. Change in value components is partially predictable from observed changes in economic structure.
3. During initial industrialization of an economy, the value components of *individualism* and *activism* increase dramatically with *futurism* increasing only slightly.
4. During professionalization and bureaucratization of the economy, *futurism* increases markedly, while *individualism* and *activism* increase only moderately.

These generalizations represent the most reasonable summary of the findings and can best be viewed as hypotheses for a more encompassing study of value change. Surprisingly, the literature on social and cultural change, although abundant, has paid little empirical attention to the research question of this study: namely, what is the pattern of profile of change in value components during the modernization of social structure?

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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15. The following procedures were employed to construct Figure 4. (1) The average score of each value component at each stage of modernization was taken from Table 2. (2) The average score of each value component for the farm transitional, industrial, and modern system was subtracted from the score of that component at the farm subsistence stage of modernization. This yielded the percentage increase of each component at each stage of modernization over what it was at the farm subsistence stage of economic development. (3) This percentage increase was then divided by the percentage score at the farm subsistence stage of modernization. The resulting figure indicated the percentage increase for each component at each stage of modernization. (4) These percentage increases are plotted on Figure 4. They allow for an examination of the *relative* pattern of change from a *common starting* point of the value components during modernization.
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