SOME ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:

INSIGHTS FROM SOCIOLOGY'S FIRST MASTERS

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ABSTRACT

From the discursive corpus of works by Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, Vilfredo Pareto, and Georg Simmel, twelve abstract principles of political processes are extracted. These principles denote the dynamics of social system differentiation, political mobilization, political oscillations, and political conflict. It is argued that, even though these principles are now quite old, they can still inform contemporary research in political sociology. The power and relevance of these principles is then illustrated by citing various lines of present-day research on political processes. In light of this brief review of research in political sociology and political science, it is argued that only the principles of political conflict from the early masters have been used to guide theory and research. And hence, the principles of political mobilization and oscillations, as these are

affected by system differentiation, can provide new avenues for contemporary research on the political dynamics of societies.

INTRODUCTION

The insights of such scholars as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber on social theory in general and political sociology in particular are well documented. Other early masters of sociological theory, such as Georg Simmel, Herbert Spencer, and Vilfredo Pareto, are given somewhat less attention in both theoretical circles and political sociology. Yet, all of these thinkers developed a number of converging and complementary "laws" of political organization. And despite the widespread attention given to some of these historical figures, few attempts have been made at extracting these laws.[1] One of the reasons for this oversight is that some, such as Marx and Weber, did not believe that abstract and universal laws on invariant properties of the social universe could be developed. This belief is shared by many within sociology. Another reason is that the ideas of various scholars are seen as "intellectual totalities," and it is considered inappropriate, if not sacrilegious, to extract only portions of a scholar's thought in an effort to isolate what is considered theoretically useful.

There are, no doubt, many other reasons for the unwillingness to examine Marx, Weber, Spencer, Durkheim, Pareto, and Simmel as social theorists who articulated some of sociology's first laws of social organization. Our purpose here is not to delineate the reasons, but to view these scholars as theorists and to extract from the corpus of their work those abstract principles and laws that still seem useful in political sociology. Naturally, Marx and Weber would turn over in their graves if they knew that this kind of exercise was performed on their work; and a good many living sociologists and political scientists are similarly unsympathetic to such exercises.

Yet, to the extent that sociology is considered a science, and to the degree that the term "science" in political science is taken seriously, we should try to extract the theoretical principles from scholars' work, state them formally, and use them in our theoretical as well as research efforts to build a cumulative science. While many do not feel that emulating "the natural sciences" is possible or appropriate, we believe that creating a "natural science of society" is a reasonable project. Accordingly, in this essay, we will try to demonstrate the utility of our view by articulating some elementary principles of political organization that can be found in the works of selected scholars, Herbert Spencer (1876:447–588), Karl Marx

([1848] 1955, 1867), Max Weber ([1920] 1968), Emile Durkheim ([1893] 1960), Georg Simmel ([1907] 1978, 1908), and Vilfredo Pareto ([1901] 1968, [1909] 1971, [1916] 1935, [1921] 1984). By extracting and abstracting principles, the surface incompatibility of various scholars' work is dramatically reduced. Indeed, there is an amazing degree of convergence in how these classical scholars viewed political processes. We should caution, however, that these principles will seem familiar because they have been used in much contemporary theory and research. Often, contemporary practitioners have themselves extracted implicitly these principles, but equally often and tragically from our viewpoint, we have also had to rediscover these principles because of an unwillingness to perform the present exercise earlier and more frequently.

Naturally, we can make only a modest beginning in using the past masters to develop political theory. Accordingly, we will confine our discussion to what we perceive to be the most interesting principles with respect to (1) Social System Differentiation, (2) Political Mobilization, (3) Political Oscillation, and (4) Political Conflict. All these principles reveal some of the conditions that influence the form of political organization in social systems. And while these principles are from 60 to 100 years old, we will indicate some of the ways that they inform contemporary theorizing in sociology and political science.

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL SYSTEM DIFFERENTIATION

Early sociological theorists clearly recognized that the degree and nature of political organization in a social system are related to its level of structural complexity. The more roles and social units that are differentiated, the greater the problems of their coordination and control, but also the greater the potential for the use of power. Thus, one of the basic questions that early thinkers such as Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Simmel, Pareto, and Weber all addressed is: what conditions increase the level of differentiation in social systems? Their answers varied somewhat, but they can be summarized as Principle 1:[2]

1. The degree of differentiation in a social system is a positive and additive function of:

    a. the level of productivity in the system (Marx, 1867; Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1909] 1971), with productivity being a positive and additive function of

       1. the level of technological knowledge (Marx, 1867; Simmel, 1890),

2. the level of access to material resources (Marx, 1867),
3. the degree of secularism and acquisitiveness emphasized in cultural symbols (Pareto, [1916] 1935; Weber, [1920] 1968);

b. the degree of competition for valued resources, with competition being a positive and additive function of
  1. the absolute size of the population (Spencer, 1876; Durkheim, [1893] 1960),
  2. the degree of ecological concentration of a population (Spencer, 1876; Durkheim, [1893] 1960),
  3. the degree of perceived scarcity in material and symbolic resources (Durkheim, [1893] 1960),
  4. the relative size of elite segments of a population (Pareto, [1909] 1971, [1916] 1935);

c. the degree to which previously differentiated social units have become integrated, with integration being a positive and additive function of
  1. the degree of functional interdependence among social units (Spencer, 1876; Durkheim, [1893] 1960),
  2. the degree of consensus over cultural symbols (Durkheim, [1893] 1960; Weber, [1920] 1968),
  3. the availability of symbolic media of exchange (Simmel, [1907] 1978),
  4. the capacity to mobilize and culturally legitimate political power (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955; Spencer, 1876; Durkheim, [1893] 1960; Pareto, [1916] 1935; Weber, [1920] 1968).

These principles link differentiation, economic productivity, competition for resources, and previous patterns of social integration. That is, high levels of productivity, competition, and integration are the generic conditions under which high levels of social differentiation are to be found. In turn, each of these three conditions is related to other forces. Productivity is dependent upon levels of technology and resource availability. Competition is related to a population's size and concentration, to its sense of resource scarcity (money, power, prestige, honor, etc.), and to the number of elites who appropriate resources and thus are viewed as competitors. Success at integrating previous patterns of social differentiation is a result of developing common values and beliefs, generalized media of social exchange (such as money and contracts), and the capacity to mobilize power to regulate transactions among differentiated social units.

While these principles may seem "obvious," they are nonetheless some

of sociology's basic laws of the social universe. Moreover, they provide a starting point for understanding political processes in social systems. First, these principles connect the degree of political organization to the level of differentiation in social systems. Second, the *form* of political organization is related to those variables—such as productivity, competition, and integration—that reveal high or low values. For example, political organization will reveal one form (i.e., unstable and dictatorial) when productivity and consensus over values and beliefs are low while competition for resources is high, whereas another form (i.e., stable and democratic) will emerge when there is high productivity, low competition, and high value consensus. Moreover, changes in the respective values of the variables will alter what we can expect to occur in social systems. In our view, one of the tasks of political theorists is to specify the conditions that influence the values of the variables in these principles as they relate to increases (or decreases) in the mobilization and use of power.

This principle of structural differentiation in social systems has, we feel, implications for much of the current literature in political sociology. For example, there exists a large literature devoted to "institution building," especially on the problems and dilemmas of the Third World (McHenry, 1979; Mazrui and Tidy, 1984), but most of this work remains uninformed by abstract theoretical principles. Similarly, there is an equally large literature on the structural conditions favoring (or discouraging) political democratization, and yet, much of this diverse literature (Almond and Verba, 1965; Moore, 1966; Tilton, 1975) does not appear to have drawn great insight from early sociological theory.

A brief and cursory review of some hypotheses in this literature can, we feel, illustrate our point. For example, one hypothesis is that "social and economic development" is a prerequisite for the spread of "political democracy" (Cutright and Wiley, 1969–1970; Dahl, 1971). This large literature focuses on the importance of factors such as literacy, mass communication, and involvement in the commercial sector. Increased modernization is thought to produce conditions favoring organizational complexity, democratic order, and political stability. A second hypothesis concerns "political culture." The development of complex and democratic political institutions is in some respects contingent upon the values, sentiments, and orientations of the common citizen. Political development is least likely where people are most parochial and passive (Banfield, 1958; Almond and Verba, 1965). A third prominent hypothesis is that rapid social change destabilizes sociopolitical institutions (Sofranko and Bealer, 1972).

Although a number of interesting case studies are now being generated in an effort to sort out these hypotheses (Putnam et al., 1983), there does not appear to be an overarching theoretical framework that makes sense of empirical findings and meaningfully interrelates competing hypotheses

(Huntington and Dominguez, 1975). We feel that sociology's early masters provided some guidelines for making these more general theoretical statements. For example, to translate some of the key concepts in Principle I, diffusion of technology, discovery of resources, and accumulation of material and human capital are typically seen to spur economic growth. Economic growth and complexity create environmental conditions necessitating political development (Powers, 1985). Population density and scarcity promote competition, which in turn undermines parochial ways of thinking and forces peasants to develop new ways of looking at the world (Farb, 1978). Modernization can be destabilizing but does not have to be. Organizational interdependence reduces instability (Sofranko and Bealer, 1972), as does the production of unifying symbols (Schwartz, 1982). Thus, many of the main findings and competing hypotheses emerging from the literature on "institution building" in political sociology can be interpreted in terms of Principle I based on the writings of Marx, Engels, Pareto, Simmel, Weber, Spencer, and Durkheim. Indeed, we feel that this principle represents at an abstract level the more generic variables and relationships that have been proposed by a variety of political theorists. In essence, Principle I provides a *structural* interpretation of "institutional development" by linking social development (and by implication, political development) to levels of social differentiation which, in turn, are connected to the conditions listed in I(a), I(b), and I(c). The connection between political development and the structural basis of "institution building" becomes even more evident when we turn to Principle II dealing with political mobilization.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

As we have indicated above, early sociologists saw political organization as inhering in social structural differentiation (the structural process behind "institution building"). Social differentiation inevitably results in increased power that is potentially available for mobilization, and in organizational forms capable of mobilizing that power. At the same time, the concentration of power is influenced by other system dynamics, such as the mobilization of counter-power and the generation of social conflict. Early sociologists distinguished between various *forms* of social differentiation in an effort to understand the ways in which the organization of power inheres in the overall structure of society. That is, depending upon not only the degree but also the form of social differentiation, political organization will vary.

Probably the most critical variables influencing the nature of political mobilization were best conceptualized by Spencer (1876), Marx ([1848]

1955, 1867), and Durkheim ([1893] 1960). Each classical sociologist emphasized a different variable, thereby rendering their respective schemes one-sided. Yet, taken together, their ideas can be translated into Principle II:

II. The degree of development in the regulatory structures that mobilize and use power is a positive and additive function of:

    a. the number, volume, and rate of internal activities among system units, with these being a positive and additive function of

        1. the absolute number of differentiated units (Spencer, 1876; Durkheim, [1893] 1960),

        2. the level of productive activity in each unit (Marx, 1867; Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1916] 1935),

        3. the level of distribution of both information and materials among units (Spencer, 1876):

    b. the degree of external threat perceived to exist in the environment of a system (Spencer, 1876; Simmel, 1903–1904, 1908);

    c. the degree of internal threat perceived to exist within the system, with perceptions of internal threat being a positive and additive function of

        1. the degree of dissimilarity in the goals of system units (Spencer, 1876),

        2. the degree of rank differentiation (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955);

    d. the lack of consensus over abstract cultural symbols (Durkheim, [1893] 1960).

In this principle, the degree of political organization is seen as connected to the productive and distributive activity among diverse units in the system. The more the activity, the greater is the need to regulate and coordinate these activities. Perceived threats (Spencer, 1876; Simmel, 1908) also encourage the elaboration of political organization, since it takes the consolidation of power and its implementation through organizations (such as the military and domestic bureaucracies) to reduce actual or imagined threats. Finally, there is a limit to how far political organization can be carried without supporting and legitimating cultural values, beliefs, and ideologies. Marx and Engels ([1848] 1955), Spencer (1876), Pareto ([1916] 1935, [1921] 1984), Weber ([1920] 1968), and Durkheim ([1893] 1960) all

emphasized the view that political organization inevitably generates tension, resistance, and counter-mobilization of power, which often erupts into conflict between those with and without resources. To mitigate this inevitability, consensus over cultural symbols becomes increasingly necessary as a condition for further political mobilization (Durkheim, [1893] 1960).

Just how political mobilization occurs in a specific empirical case is, of course, beyond the capacity of abstract theory to document. But the principles articulated above provide the general theorems from which deductions to particular cases can be made. Depending on the values of these variables, different degrees and forms of political mobilization are likely. It is in specifying the theoretical consequences of different weightings of the variables in Principle II that both theory and research in political science and sociology should be directed. For example, as Simmel (1908) and Spencer (1876) emphasized, highly centralized political mobilization is likely under conditions of external threat. Or, to take another example, coercive and centralized systems are likely when consensus over cultural symbols is low, especially under conditions of internal threat. Thus, the abstract theorems provided by the first masters may, at first glance, seem obvious and trivial, but on the contrary, they provide insight into the relations among the generic variables from which further deductions to specific cases can be made.

In fact, most of the existing literature on political mobilization is an empirical description of the processes outlined at a more abstract level in Principle II. This literature tends to focus on the political instability of societies during the transition from agrarian to industrial forms of development (Moore, 1966; Migdal, 1974; Tilly, 1978). That is, much of the political mobilization literature concentrates on the II(c) portion of Principle II, whereas the first masters emphasize other processes (II[a], II[b]) as equally important. Thus, the insights of these early sociologists might be seen as providing additional variables for research on "political mobilization" in differentiating (Principle I) social systems.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OSCILLATION

One of the most frequently rendered observations on political processes is that political organization tends to oscillate between centralized and decentralized profiles. Actually, the long-run trend appears to be toward ever greater centralization of power at the societal level of social organization, with periodic efforts to decentralize power in order to forestall for a time further centralization.

Some of the early theorists sought to understand the dialectical forces

inherent in both centralized and decentralized forms of political organization. For scholars such as Spencer (1876) and Pareto ([1921] 1984), centralized power generates pressures for decentralization, whereas decentralized forms of power activate processes encouraging centralization. Unfortunately, much of the commentary on Spencer and Pareto has retained their awkward vocabulary (such as "lions," "foxes," "speculators," "reteniers," "militant," and "industrial") and has not extracted the more generic properties of power that these concepts denote.

The basic insight of Spencer, Pareto, and to a lesser extent, Durkheim is that decentralized political systems create integrative problems of coordination and control. These problems can stem from the lack of unifying cultural symbols, the diversity of productive and distributive activity, and the over-use of co-optation[3] as a means of political regulation. These dynamics are stated below in Principles III, IV, and V:

III. The greater the level of decentralization of political power in a social system, the greater are:

   a. the diversity and inconsistency of cultural symbols (Durkheim, [1893] 1960; Pareto, [1916] 1935);

   b. the diversity of productive and distributive activity (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1909] 1971, [1916] 1935);

   c. the use of co-optation as a means of political regulation (Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1916] 1935).

VI. The greater (a) the diversity of productive and distributive activity, (b) the level of diversity in cultural symbols, and (c) the use of co-optation as a means of political regulation in a social system, the greater are the problems of coordination, control, and integration in that system (Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1916] 1935, [1921] 1984).

V. The greater the problems of coordination, control, and integration in a social system, the more likely is the mobilization and consolidation of power in that system (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1916] 1935).

Conversely, political centralization sets into motion pressures for decentralization. Centralized power involves direct regulation, often backed by the use (or the threat) of coercion. Moreover, it tends to restrict the variety of productive and distributive activities so as to conform to political directives. And, it seeks to articulate and impose conservative cultural symbols. Over time, these restrictions create tensions and pressures for

decentralization which will often be resisted (thereby creating further centralization of power) but which eventually will result in some decentralization. If such decentralization does not occur, more intense forms of conflict can result (see next section). These insights are formalized in Principles VI, VII, and VIII:

VI.   The greater the level of centralization of political power in a social system, the greater are:

     a.   the use of direct regulation and (the threat of) coercion (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1916] 1935, [1921] 1984);

     b.   the restrictions on productive and distributive activities (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1909] 1971, [1916] 1935);

     c.   the efforts to articulate and impose conservative cultural symbols (Durkheim, [1893] 1960; Pareto, [1916] 1935).

VII.   The greater the degree of (a) direct regulation and/or the use of coercion, (b) constraint on productive and distributive activities, and (c) imposition of conservative cultural symbols, the greater is the level of resentment against the agents of centralized political power (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1916] 1935, [1921] 1984).

VIII.   The greater the level of resentment against the agents of centralized political power, the greater are the pressures for decentralization of political power (Spencer, 1876; Pareto, [1901] 1968, [1916] 1935, [1921] 1984).

Political oscillations between centralized and decentralized system profiles are thus the result of certain processes that inhere in one of these two states. We have phrased the propositions in a way that avoids previous interpretations of Spencer and Pareto. These interpretations inappropriately emphasize the inevitability of the full cycle from a centralized to decentralized system profile, and vice versa. While Pareto's work connotes this inevitability, Spencer's does not; and even Pareto was more cautious than is often recognized. Much more important for our purposes is their recognition of the inherent pressures for centralization in decentralized systems and for decentralization of centralized systems. Just whether this cycle is completed depends upon the empirical values of the variables in a particular system. But Spencer and Pareto clearly recognized the critical relationships among the use of power, the diversity of productive and distributive activity, the nature of cultural symbols, the levels of social

integration, and the degree of accumulated resentment among members of a population.

These principles, we feel, provide the foundation for much of the current research literature on political sociology. For example, there is considerable controversy over such issues as "the inevitable rise of oligarchy" (Michels, [1915] 1959), the existence of "power elites" (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1959; Rose, 1967; Dahl, 1971; Useem, 1984), the centralization of "monopoly capital and power" (Baran and Sweezey, 1966; Szymanski, 1981), the expansion of the "bureaucratic state and its control systems" (Hage and Aiken, 1967; Collins, 1975), and similar topics about how power becomes concentrated in social systems (Dye, 1983). Principles III through VIII place many of these debates in the research literature into a theoretical context. What they do is emphasize the dialectical nature of power—that is, centralization produces pressures for decentralization, and vice versa. Moreover, they specify the conditions that produce these pressures for decentralized systems (Principle IV) and centralized systems (Principle VII). Thus, depending upon the point in the cycle when cross-sectional research is undertaken, we suspect that different results will obtain. And rather than viewing highly centralized or decentralized political systems as inevitable, these principles point to the systematic fluctuations in the *degree of* concentration in power. As such, they provide interesting research leads that can avoid many of the problems of over-generalization in the research literature (see Klapp, 1975).

In particular, the principles direct attention to the diversity in (a) cultural symbols, (b) productive activities, and (c) co-optation as variables that influence the direction of the centralization–decentralization cycle (Principles III and IV). And so, rather than viewing these points in the cycle as end states in themselves, they appear to be conditions that produce tendencies toward their opposite. Surprisingly, for all of the emphasis on "the dialectic of power" at the conceptual level in social theory, research has tended to ignore the view that centralization–decentralization are processes. We think that these principles of political oscillations, therefore, can re-orient the research literature on the topic of how and when power becomes concentrated.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

All theorists of the nineteenth century recognized that the concentration of power activates processes for the mobilization of counter-power. This mobilization is often translated into decentralization of power, as is delineated in Principles III through VIII above. But under certain conditions, the concentration of power generates active resistance that escalates into

open conflict between the agents of political authority and opposition groups. The combined theoretical legacy of Marx, Simmel, and Weber gives us some clues as to what these conditions are.

The key conflict-producing dynamics reside in the respective degrees of concentration in, and the strength of the correlation among, political, material, and symbolic resources. The greater the nonrandom concentrations and distribution of these resources, and the higher the correlation among them, the greater is the potential for conflict (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955; Weber, [1920] 1968). Just what conditions are considered critical in translating such inequality into conflict vary from theorist to theorist, but a composite formulation of their ideas can be expressed in the following principles:

IX.   The degree of inequality in a social system is a positive and joint function of:

   a.   the level of concentration of political, material, and symbolic resources (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955);

   b.   the strength of the correlation in the distribution of political, material, and symbolic resources (Weber, [1920] 1968).

X.   The degree of incompatibility of interests among segments in a population is a positive function of the degree of inequality (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955).

XI.   The degree to which incompatibilities in interests become translated into conflict is a positive and additive function of:

   a.   the level of awareness among the deprived and subordinate segments of a population about the extent of inequalities, with such awareness being positively and additively related to

      1.   the level of alienation in subordinate populations (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955),

      2.   the degree of disruptive change in the daily routines of subordinate populations (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955),

      3.   the degree of communication among subordinate populations (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955),

      4.   the extent of restrictions on upward social mobility (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955; Weber, [1920] 1968);

   b.   the availability of charismatic leaders to (a) codify resentments of subordinate populations into a unified ideology, and (b) arouse the emotions of subordinates (Marx and Engels [1848] 1955; Simmel, 1908; Weber, [1920] 1968);

   c.   the capacity of subordinates to become politically organized, with such organization being positively related to (a) and (b) above and negatively related to

      1.   the degree of organization among superordinate populations (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955),

      2.   the degree of consensus among subordinates and superordinates over abstract cultural symbols (Pareto, [1916] 1935; Weber [1920] 1968).

XII.   The degree of violence in the conflict between superordinates and subordinates in a social system is positively related to XI(a) and XI(b) above (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955; Simmel, 1908) and negatively related to XI(c) above (Simmel, 1908).

Principles IX through XII summarize at an abstract level some of the basic arguments of Marx, Weber, and Simmel on the topic of conflict. According to these first masters, conflict ultimately emanates from inequalities and the capacity of subordinates to become aware of their situation, to develop leaders who can mobilize ideological sentiments, and to organize on behalf of their cause. However, contrary to Marx's (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1955) assertions, the degree of violence of such conflict is negatively related to political organization among subordinates. Violence is most likely to occur, according to Marx, when subordinates are aware of inequalities, become emotionally aroused, and develop political organization. With organization, however, clear leaders, goals, and programs are outlined, with the result that superordinates and subordinates are more likely to bargain and compromise. Yet, once violence is initiated it can force subordinates to organize and pursue further violence against the superordinate's agents of coercion.

The research literature on conflict processes, of course, is enormous (Coser, 1968; Shelling, 1971; Kriesberg, 1982). It ranges from the study of societal revolutions (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Paige, 1975; Kelley and Klein, 1977) to the mobilizations for change-producing social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983). In many respects, these principles on conflict processes from the early masters have already been incorporated into the research literature. The revolutionary conflict literature tends to emphasize "relative deprivation" and other conditions listed in Principle XI(a), whereas the social movements literature stresses the conditions in XI(b) and XI(c). Thus, it may well be the case that the principles of these early masters will continue to offer guidance for the growing research literature on conflict in political sociology. But it is nonetheless important, we feel, to articulate the principles clearly so that we can appreciate which portions have become well integrated into research literature.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have not sought to present a comprehensive theory. Rather, we have articulated in rough form twelve basic theoretical principles from the early masters on how and why political organization increases, oscillates, and generates conflict. Most of these principles had been clearly articulated before the turn of the last century, and they stand at the core of our understanding about political processes in social systems. Of course, they require supplementation, but our intent has been to extract only the essence of Spencer's, Marx's, Simmel's, Durkheim's, Pareto's, and Weber's thoughts on political structure and dynamics. Obviously, these great scholars addressed additional issues and developed principles on other properties of social systems.

We have briefly commented upon the relevance of these principles to certain research traditions in political sociology, but we have not tried to summarize the entire literature. Our sense is that only in the area of political conflict have the principles of the early masters been fully incorporated into, and extended by, the research literature (for a thorough coverage of the recent political sociology literature, see Weil and Dobratz, 1984). The other principles, we feel, provide some interesting leads for researchers. In particular, we see it as desirable to incorporate more explicitly the process of structural differentiation (Principle I) into theoretical and research activity on political mobilization and oscillation (Principles II through VIII).

Of course, it should not surprise us that these principles require supplementation and reformulation. They are, after all, rather old. But if only to highlight what these first masters gave us as a theoretical legacy, the exercise in this essay, we believe, has been worthwhile. The real work now begins: to reformulate Principles I through VIII, as has been implicitly done for those on conflict (Principles IX through XII), in ways that revitalize them and make them useful in research on political processes.

NOTES

1. An exception is the author's efforts in Turner (1978), and Turner and Beeghley (1981) to develop theoretical principles.

2. This and the other eleven principles presented in this essay reflect a certain vision of theory building. See Turner (1978, 1980) for a more complete discussion. It should be emphasized that these are macro principles and therefore address only the most basic affinities among generic properties of social systems. They are the theorems of an axiomatic system of theoretical deduction. They also set the parameters within which micro analysis can be profitably pursued.

3. For our usage here, co-optation is the method of gaining voluntary compliance and cooperation from differentiated units by making sure that the vested interests of those units are interdependent.

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